Strategic Plans (December 1940)

General Friedrich Paulus

December 1940

Earlier in September, I was appointed Oberquartiermeister to draw up substantive plans for Barbarossa. After reading Marcks’ plan, it seemed that the plan is insufficient. More forces must be made available and the size of the reserves must be reduced. The available forces will be divided into three groups, North, Centre and South, and each to be conducted separately in the first stage of the invasion.

We will eliminate all Russian forces in western Russia with bold thrusts by columns of Penzer divisions, deep into Russian territories. Our main objective will be to cordon off Asiatic Russia along the general line Volga – Archangel, preventing the Red Army’s withdrawal and disabling the Russian air arm.

The first report has already been submitted to Halder and the accompanying maps completed. With the war games, we came to realize that the separate advancement of the three army groups would lead to gaps between them in Lake Ilmen-Veleiki-Luki and Gomel. However, keeping in mind of the priority of capturing Moscow, Army Group Centre should be kept at maximum strength. Army Group North and South will have to clear these gaps with their own forces.

Nonetheless, I believe that the superiority of our forces will be able to clear even the hardest obstacle. We must keep in mind that the Red Army is inferior in terms of armour, artillery, aircrafts and combat capabilities.

The primary assessment is that the decisive operation will be Moscow, upon which the success of Don Basin and Leningrad depends. But now we have a major problem on our hands. It is surprising that even before the war games and operational studies were complete that the draft was taken to the Fuhrer. Earlier this month, the Fuhrer expressed disapproval of Moscow being the primary objective. He assessed that Leningrad would be more important for it is the cradle of Bolshevism.

Changes must be made to incorporate Leningrad into the Deployment Directives

Heil Hitler!

Friedrich Paulus

Operation Barbarossa? (November 1940)

General Heinz Guderian
November 1940

For the past few months, the tension between us and Russia had increased due to a number of incidents. Molotov the Soviet Foreign Commissar was invited to Berlin to resolve these issues.

“Shortly after Molotov’s visit, my new Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-colonel Freiherr von Liebenstein, and my first general staff officer, Major Bayerlein, were summoned to a conference by the Chief of the Army General Staff; there they heard for the first time about the proposed campaign against Soviet Russia, Operation Barbaross.”

UNBELIEVABLE! Didn’t Hitler criticize the leaders of German policy of 1914 for their failure to avoid a war on two fronts? Has he now decided to open this second-front war against the Russian? With the war with England still ongoing, invading Russia will without a doubt, leave us committed to a two-front war.

From my two officers, I understand that studies have been made and it is calculated that Russia would fall in the span of eight to ten weeks. The preliminary plan was an offensive force of three army groups with diverging objectives. From my professional point of view, there is no clear single operational objective and it did not look at all promising. Furthermore, the operation does not seem important compared to the task we face in the west and will in no way improve our situation. If we are to commit to Russia, our position will certainly become increasingly difficult.

It is clear that our preparations for this massive campaign is inadequate, but it seems that the victory in Poland and France have befuddled the minds of our supreme commanders. It appears that the OKW and OKH are convinced with unshakable optimism about Operation Barbarossa.

Heinz Guderian